Security by builder

Every AI builder leaks in its own way.

The security risks in an AI-built app depend on how it was built. Pick your builder for the specific issues it tends to produce, what to check, and how to scan it before you launch.

AI app builder

Lovable security

A Lovable app is as secure as its Supabase setup. Lovable now runs a built-in pre-publish scan (a genuinely good first line), but the recurring problems — a service-role key reachable from the browser, tables with row-level security off, third-party secret keys in frontend code — still slip through, because the app works in a demo either way. An independent scan before launch catches what's left.

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AI app builder

Bolt.new security

Bolt.new apps most often leak secrets through the frontend bundle. Any variable prefixed VITE_ is compiled into browser JavaScript, Bolt keeps .env as plaintext in the project tree (readable by anyone with a shared project link), and Supabase RLS is off by default. None of this stops the app from working — which is exactly why it ships.

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AI app builder & IDE

Replit security

Replit gives you a Secrets manager, but the common problems are developers hardcoding keys anyway, environment variables leaking into the client, databases left open, and insecure deployment settings. Replit's AI agent will happily generate all of these while the app keeps working.

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AI code editor

Cursor security

Cursor is an AI code editor, not a host, so its security comes down to the code it writes and what you commit. The common issues are committed .env files and keys, missing or comment-only auth checks, and Supabase tables without row-level security. Cursor will generate working code with any of these.

Check Cursor apps →
AI UI builder (Vercel)

v0 security

v0 generates Next.js interfaces, and it's strong at the frontend. The security risk appears when you wire that UI to data: a secret stored with a NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix is exposed in the browser, API routes ship reachable by default, and a Supabase backend added later often has row-level security off.

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AI coding agent (Anthropic)

Claude Code security

Claude Code writes and runs real code in your repo and terminal, so security depends on what lands in the repo and what you deploy. It's capable of following security instructions well, but without them it can still commit a .env, leave an endpoint unauthenticated, or scaffold a database without row-level security.

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AI code editor (Codeium)

Windsurf security

Windsurf is an agentic editor, so like Cursor its security is about the code it writes and what you deploy. The recurring issues are committed secrets, endpoints without enforced auth, and Supabase tables without row-level security — all of which still run fine, so they ship.

Check Windsurf apps →